GOVERNANCE · LIVE

Power doesn't live in a prompt.

A model can propose an action. The authority chain, capability scope and a human decide how far that action actually goes.

Model requestfile.write
Policy preflightworkspace only
Human approvalrequired
Execution receiptrecorded

GIÁM THỊ

A supervisor that runs outside the AI session,
not a hook that ends with it.

Claude/Codex/Cursor hooks only enforce a shared safety state — they hold no HALT authority of their own. That authority belongs only to the Giám Thị native supervisor, running independently at the OS level, outside any AI session.

Periodic tick

Collects CPU, RAM, disk, GPU, heartbeat SLO and running-session count, along with a tamper-evident receipt chain.

yana-rt os supervisor tick → health receipt → tamper-evident chain

HALT via a shared lock file

An anomaly is detected → a shared lock file is created → every Claude/Codex/Cursor hook respects it immediately.

.claude/state/ GIAMTHI_HALT.lock

Unlocking needs a human ceremony

Clearing a HALT requires the actor and reason to be recorded before the lock is removed — no agent can unlock itself.

unlock requires actor + reason recorded first

AUTHORITY CHAIN

Allow, ask, or deny.
No grey zone.

YanaAuthorityChain runs a deterministic preflight before any real action; Giám Thị holds the highest HALT authority.

Capability manifest

Every action has a formal name, a risk tier and its own approval requirement.

capability file.write risk mutating approval required

Scoped leases

Permission is bounded by subject, scope and time — and revocable.

subject current session scope /workspace ttl 27 min revoke available

Fail loudly

Missing governance has to surface — never silently skip a permission check.

guard missing → stop denied → visible HALT → highest

AUDIT

A trail you can verify.

The audit log uses a hash chain to detect tampering. Yana names it accurately: tamper-detectable, not oversold as tamper-proof.

Proposal#a81f
Decision#bd40
Execution#c298
Receipt#ef31